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1. introduction
The inclusion of money laundering within the jurisdiction of the African
Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Court) is novel and
innovative.1 But if the African Court eventually exercises its jurisdiction over
the offence of money laundering, it would not, in fact, be the ﬁrst inter-
national criminal court or tribunal to undertake ﬁnancial investigations in
connection with criminal prosecutions. One of the International Criminal
Court’s (ICC) earliest situations, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC), required it to investigate money laundering by armed groups and
organized crime groups engaged in the exploitation of mineral resources in
Ituri.2 The ICC Prosecutor considered that the exploitation of natural
resources in the region was, in part, fuelling the alleged atrocities, and that
the international banking system was facilitating money laundering in this
context.3 Even though the ICC lacked the capacity to charge individuals for
money laundering itself, the Prosecutor viewed such ﬁnancial investigations
as, nevertheless, playing an important role in the prevention and prosecution
of atrocities within the court’s jurisdiction.4
The inclusion of the offence of money laundering in the African Court’s
Amended Protocol on the Statute of the African Court allows prosecutors at
1 African Union, Draft Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African
Court of Justice and Human Rights, Exp/Min/IV/Rev.7 (May 2012), art. 28Ibis.
2 Second Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
Report of the Prosecutor of the ICC, Mr Luis Moreno-Ocampo, 8 September 2003, 3–4.
3 ICC Press Release, ‘Communications Received by the Ofﬁce of the Prosecutor of the ICC’
(No.: pids.009.2003-EN), 16 July 2003, 3–4.
4 Ibid.
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the Court to go beyond the ICC’s use of ﬁnancial investigations in a support-
ing capacity. The African Court would not only be in a position to support the
prosecution of other crimes through money laundering investigations, but it
would also be able to bring charges against the accused for the very act of
money laundering. This would bring a number of beneﬁts. By prosecuting
money laundering as well as corruption, the African Court would be able to
highlight the detrimental impact of economic crimes, which can play a
structural role in fuelling the perpetration of atrocities such as war crimes
and crimes against humanity, as seen in the DRC. In addition, by virtue of the
fact that the African Court, like the ICC, operates on the basis of the principle
of complementarity, its jurisdiction over money laundering could also, at least
in theory, have the effect of prompting more domestic law enforcement
actions regarding money laundering. Convictions for money laundering at
the African Court could also potentially facilitate the identiﬁcation, freezing,
and seizure of assets that may be repatriated or used for the purpose of
reparations for victims.
But a number of signiﬁcant obstacles, both jurisdictional and evidentiary,
may stand in the way of successful prosecutions of money laundering at the
African Court. From a jurisdictional standpoint, defence counsel can be
expected to raise arguments about violations of the principle of nullum crimen
sine lege on account of the absence of any customary international legal norm
prohibiting money laundering. In addition, the narrow scope of the offence of
money laundering, as set out in the Amended Protocol, would prevent
prosecutors from bringing charges in any context other than corruption of a
‘serious nature affecting the stability of a state, region or the Union’.5 Despite
the fact that many other crimes within the African Court’s jurisdiction can
generate proceeds that are laundered, the Amended Protocol restricts the
offence of money laundering to proceeds generated from serious forms of
corruption. This means that acts of money laundering in connection with
other crimes, besides serious, high-level corruption, would have to be pros-
ecuted at the national level. Finally, not all of the possible preconditions for
the exercise of jurisdiction by the African Court would be relevant or viable for
the prosecution of money laundering, thus potentially further restricting the
prosecutor’s ability to bring charges for such conduct.6 Although the Court
may, in theory, exercise its jurisdiction based on the nationality of victims as
well as the effects of extraterritorial acts (the passive personality and protective
5 Amended Protocol, art. 28I(1) (chapeau).
6 Ibid., art. 46Ebis.
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principles, respectively), in practice these jurisdictional preconditions will not
be workable in the money laundering context.
From an evidentiary perspective, complex ﬁnancial investigations could be
expected to strain or exceed the prosecution’s human and ﬁnancial resources.
In addition, prosecutors conducting such investigations would likely be heav-
ily dependent on cooperation not only from states parties, but also non-state
parties with no legal obligation to comply with requests for assistance in
obtaining evidence, freezing assets, etc.7 Because many major banking centres
lie outside of Africa in non-states parties, the Court’s inability to oblige
cooperation may signiﬁcantly impede its capacity to gather evidence. More-
over, some non-states parties may be reluctant, in the ﬁrst place, to cooperate
with investigations that could undermine their own domestic law enforce-
ment efforts.
This chapter begins by explaining why prosecuting money laundering at
the African Court would not only be novel, but could also be beneﬁcial for the
Court’s exercise of criminal jurisdiction more broadly (Section 2). The
following sections address the jurisdictional and evidentiary challenges that
could arise during the course of investigations and prosecutions (Sections 3
and 4), before exploring the possibility that money laundering prosecutions
could facilitate asset recovery and repatriation (Section 5).
2. why prosecute money laundering at the african court?
Calls for international prosecution of money laundering have been relatively
rare. But this does not necessarily mean that international courts could not or
should not undertake prosecutions of this offence. In fact, ﬁnancial investi-
gations concerning money laundering have already been carried out by the
Special Court for Sierra Leone and the ICC for various reasons other than
bringing criminal charges. The international legal framework for combating
money laundering has, however, always been premised on the notion that
domestic courts are responsible for prosecuting the offence of money launder-
ing. Various international instruments require or call on states to criminalize
money laundering in their domestic legal systems, and to cooperate with other
states in prosecuting offenders through extradition and mutual legal assistance.
While numerous international treaties require states to criminalize money
laundering, they do not actually create any international criminal liability for
this offence. They assume that enforcement is a matter for domestic rather
than international courts.
7 Ibid., art. 46L.
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The widespread domestic criminalization of money laundering began
following the adoption of the 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit
Trafﬁc in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988 Vienna Con-
vention) as well as the 40 Recommendations of the Financial Action Task
Force (FATF), which were ﬁrst issued in 1990.8 Treaty provisions addressing
money laundering have since multiplied, and expanded in scope, with the
conclusion of the 2000 United Nations Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime (UNTOC) and the 2003 United Nations Convention
against Corruption (UNCAC), as well as a number of regional anti-corruption
treaties, including the African Union Convention on Preventing and Com-
bating Corruption (AU Convention).9 The 1988 Vienna Convention and the
1990 version of the FATF Recommendations were both narrow in scope in
that they addressed money laundering in the sole context of drug trafﬁcking,
meaning that these instruments targeted the laundering of the proceeds of
drug trafﬁcking alone. But UNTOC and UNCAC include broader provisions
on money laundering that call upon states to criminalize the laundering of the
proceeds of ‘the widest range of predicate offences’.10 At a minimum, states
parties must establish as predicate offences the criminal offences set out in the
Conventions themselves (eg organized crime, bribery, etc).11 Likewise, later
versions of the FATF 40 Recommendations have also called on states to
criminalize money laundering in relation to all serious offences.12
The Amended Protocol builds on the 1988 Vienna Convention, UNTOC,
UNCAC, and the AU Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption,
but at the same time it also points anti-money laundering enforcement in a
notably different direction. Moreover, it does so without the beneﬁt of scholarly
debate about the merits and drawbacks of this potential shift. The Amended
Protocol builds on these treaties by adopting very similar language – Article
8 United Nations Convention against Illicit Trafﬁc in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances (adopted 20 December 1988, entered into force 11 November 1990) 1582 UNTS 95;
Financial Action Task Force, ‘International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and
the Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation: The FATF Recommendations’ (February 2012).
9 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (adopted 15 November
2000, entered into force 29 September 2003) 2225 UNTS 209; United Nations Convention
against Corruption (adopted 11 December 2003, entered into force 14 December 2005)
2349 UNTS 41. The regional anti-corruption treaties include African Union Convention on
Preventing and Combating Corruption (adopted 11 July 2003, entered into force 5 August 2006)
(2004) 43 ILM 5; Inter-American Convention against Corruption (adopted on 29 March 1996,
entered into force 6 March 1997) (1996) ILM 724.
10 UNTOC art. 6(2)(a), UNCAC art. 23(2)(a).
11 UNTOC art. 6(2)(b); UNCAC art. 23(2)(b).
12 FATF 40 Recommendations, Recommendation 3.
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28Ibis of the Amended Protocol replicates the language in the AU Conven-
tion’s money laundering provision, which itself strongly resembles the rele-
vant provisions of the 1988 Vienna Convention, UNTOC and UNCAC.13
But, as will be discussed in Section 3.B, the Amended Protocol also departs
from the current approach to criminalizing money laundering by narrowing
the scope of the offence to the laundering of ‘the proceeds of corruption and
related offences’ – an apparent reference to Article 28I on corruption. The
Amended Protocol also points anti-money laundering enforcement efforts in
a notably different direction by granting a regional court criminal jurisdiction
over an offence that has always been prosecuted at the domestic level. In
doing so, the drafters of the African Court could not draw upon or beneﬁt
from previous discussions among state ofﬁcials about the potential wisdom or
pitfalls of this shift because the negotiators of the Rome Statute barely
contemplated the possibility of granting the ICC jurisdiction over money
laundering.
While the negotiators of the Rome Statute debated the inclusion of trans-
national crimes like drug trafﬁcking and terrorism at relatively great length,
the possibility of including money laundering attracted very little attention.
Some states apparently supported the inclusion of money laundering in the
Rome Statute, and Nigeria even expressed this view orally at the Rome
Conference.14 But the negotiators never seriously considered including money
laundering in the Rome Statute, nor did they consider revisiting this issue at
the Review Conference in Kampala in 2010.15 Given that the negotiators
lacked sufﬁcient time at the Rome Conference to settle higher-priority issues
like the inclusion of drug trafﬁcking and the deﬁnition of aggression, money
laundering understandably received very little attention.16 As a result, the
merits and drawbacks of prosecuting money laundering were never fully
debated by states (or by NGOs and scholars) during the Rome Conference
or before the inclusion of money laundering in the Amended Protocol of the
African Court. At the Rome Conference, the limited amount of time available
for negotiations appears to have precluded the inclusion of transnational
crimes, such as drug trafﬁcking and money laundering. By contrast, time
13 1988 Vienna Convention art. 3(1)(b); UNTOC art. 6; UNCAC art. 23; AU Convention art. 6.
14 A. Schloenhardt, ‘Transnational Organised Crime and the International Criminal Court:
Towards Global Criminal Justice’ 24 University of Queensland Journal (2005) at 93, 120.
15 Ibid.
16 P. Robinson, ‘The Missing Crimes’ in A. Cassese et al. (ed) The Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court: A Commentary, Volume I (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2002) at 497, 506.
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constraints appear to have had the opposite effect with respect to the drafting
of the Amended Protocol – transnational crimes were included en masse, with
seemingly little debate about the reasons or consequences.
Had there been such a debate among states during the drafting of either the
Rome Statute or the Amended Protocol, then delegates might have discussed
the potential beneﬁts to prosecuting money laundering at international courts,
as well as the serious jurisdictional and evidentiary problems that might arise.
They might have noted, for example, that prosecutors could beneﬁt from the
ability to link economic crimes with the commission of other international
and transnational crimes. Economic crimes such as corruption and money
laundering can be among the structural causes of violence, and yet prosecu-
tors at international criminal courts and tribunals lack jurisdiction over these
types of systemic injustices.17 The same is true in the broader ﬁeld of transi-
tional justice, which has also tended to overlook economic crimes.18 Truth
and reconciliation commissions, for instance, have typically focused on vio-
lence by the police, military and paramilitary that violates civil and political
rights rather than non-violent economic crimes.19
Although international criminal courts and tribunals have not yet fully
grappled with the factual and legal links between economic crimes and armed
conﬂict, the connections are discernible and have been the subject of reports
and newspaper articles, if not judgments.20 In Sierra Leone and Liberia, for
instance, the former Liberian President Charles Taylor reportedly amassed a
fortune through control over natural resources in the two states, including
control over diamond areas, the iron ore industry, and timber as well as the
Firestone rubber plantation in Liberia.21 The revenue generated through this
illicit exploitation of natural resources is widely understood to have allowed
Taylor to fund armed factions that perpetrated atrocities in Sierra Leone and
fuelled conﬂict in the region.22 The SCSL trial judgment in the Taylor case is,
however, primarily limited to ﬁndings about Taylor’s receipt of rough dia-
monds from leaders of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in exchange for
17 R. Carranza, ‘Plunder and Pain: Should Transitional Justice Engage with Corruption and
Economic Crimes?’ 2 International Journal of Transitional Justice (2008) at 310, 316–17.
18 ibid. at 319.
19 Ibid.
20 See e.g. P. R. Keefe, ‘Buried Secrets: How an Israeli Billionaire Wrested Control of One of
Africa’s Biggest Prizes’ The New Yorker (8 July 2013).
21 International Coalition for Justice, Following Taylor’s Money: A Path of War and Destruction
(2005), at 16.
22 See e.g. D. Carvajal, ‘Hunting for Liberia’s Missing Millions’ The New York Times, (Monrovia,
Liberia 30 May 2010).
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arms, ammunition, and other supplies.23 The Court also found that Taylor
facilitated a relationship between a Belgian diamond dealer and a leader of the
RUF, Issa Sesay, for the purpose of diamond transactions.24 But the trial
judgment makes no further ﬁndings about what Taylor did with the diamonds
and the wealth they generated. The judgment makes no mention of the fact
that Taylor apparently sent money abroad, to bank accounts in Switzerland,
Burkina Faso, and elsewhere.25 The judgment also makes no mention of
Taylor’s extensive use of false aliases or identities and shell companies, which
seems to have been designed to enable him to launder the proceeds of crimes,
namely revenue from the illicit extraction of natural resources.26
The charges in the Taylor indictment arguably generated little need for the
trial chamber to go further in its ﬁndings about how Taylor funded the armed
conﬂict. Nor would such ﬁndings have been feasible for the trial chamber on
the basis of the evidence before them in this case, as the parties relied heavily
on witness testimony rather than the type of documentary evidence that would
be needed to demonstrate money laundering in the context of the diamond
trade. But the problem of stolen assets did not escape the notice of the SCSL,
as the Prosecutor did request ‘all states concerned’ to identify, locate, and
freeze Taylor’s assets in their territory.27 In July 2003, the Prosecutor met with
some success in this respect, as the Swiss government complied with a request
from the Prosecutor to freeze approximately US$1.5 million in Swiss bank
accounts held by two persons associated with Taylor.28
The Taylor case illustrates one of the advantages of conducting investigations
into ﬁnancial crimes alongside investigations of atrocities: the potential for asset
recovery. While the investigations into Taylor’s assets by the SCSL as well as the
United Nations and the Liberian government have yet to meet with signiﬁcant
success or the repatriation of funds, such asset recovery efforts are typically very
lengthy and could still yield a positive outcome for Liberia. In addition, money
laundering investigations have the advantage of producing evidence about the
commission of other crimes. Such investigations can play an important role in
supporting investigations of other predicate crimes, the proceeds of which have
23 Trial Judgment, Prosecutor v Charles Ghankay Taylor (SCSL-03–01-T), Trial Chamber II,
18 May 2012, §§ 5843–6149.
24 Ibid. at § 6103.
25 International Coalition for Justice supra note 21.
26 Ibid. at 7.
27 Prosecutor v Charles Ghankay Taylor, Warrant of Arrest and Order for Transfer and Detention,
7 March 2003, 3.
28 SCSL Ofﬁce of the Prosecutor Press Release, ‘2 Million of Taylor’s Assets Frozen’ 23 July 2003
(2 million in Swiss Francs).
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been laundered.29 Money laundering investigations can provide critical evi-
dence regarding where money originated, when it was received or deposited,
and who the beneﬁciaries are.30 Though the Amended Protocol limits money
laundering to the predicate offence of corruption, money laundering investi-
gations at the African Court could still support charges of other crimes, even if
money laundering itself could not necessarily be included in an indictment.
Finally, investigations of money laundering by international prosecutors could
potentially expose or bring attention to the roles played by foreign individuals,
companies, and banks in armed conﬂicts and large-scale corruption in African
states. Such exposure could even help to trigger or provide evidentiary support
for domestic investigations in non-African states.31
3. jurisdictional questions
Prosecutors at the African Court can expect to encounter a number of
jurisdictional hurdles in attempting to try individuals or legal persons for the
offence of money laundering under Article 28Ibis of the Amended Protocol. In
an initial prosecution for money laundering, defence counsel would be likely
to challenge the provision’s compliance with the principle of nullum crimen
sine lege, or the principle of legality. Even if judges were to ﬁnd that the
principle of legality poses no problems for the offence of money laundering,
prosecutors may still ﬁnd that the provision’s limited scope or subject matter
jurisdiction prevents frequent reliance on it. In addition, the possible precon-
ditions for the exercise of jurisdiction, as set out under Article 46Ebis of the
Amended Protocol, are also likely to be limited.
A. The Principle of Nullum Crimen Sine Lege
Given that the African Court would be the ﬁrst international criminal court to
exercise jurisdiction over money laundering, defence counsel can be expected
to challenge the legality of the Court’s jurisdiction on the basis of the principle
of nullum crimen sine lege. Defence counsel might argue, for example, that
the African Court lacks jurisdiction over money laundering because the
offence has not been criminalized under international law, customary or
conventional. A number of international treaties include provisions on money
29 Financial Action Task Force,Operational Issues: Financial Investigations Guidance, June 2012,
§ 23.
30 Ibid.
31 S. Starr, ‘Extraordinary Crimes at Ordinary Times: International Justice Beyond Crisis
Situations’ 101 Northwestern University Law Review (2007) at 1257, 1287–8.
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laundering (e.g. the 1988 Vienna Convention and UNTOC), but these
treaties do not enjoy universal participation among African states and cannot
be viewed as evidence of custom, for reasons explained below. Moreover,
these treaties also do not, by themselves, create international criminal respon-
sibility, as they only require states to criminalize money laundering under
domestic, as opposed to international law.
But prosecutors should be able to overcome jurisdictional challenges based
on the principle of legality by arguing that Article 28Ibis not only sets out the
Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, but also provides the applicable law.32 In
other words, this provision is both jurisdictional and substantive. This would
not be a novel legal argument. In fact, scholars have made the same argu-
ments about Articles 6, 7, 8, and 8bis of the Rome Statute of the ICC, which
respectively concern genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and
aggression.33 These provisions do not entirely conform with customary inter-
national law. But because the articles themselves criminalize the crimes over
which the Court enjoys jurisdiction and they only apply prospectively, the
principle of nullum crimen sine lege does not pose problems. This approach to
the Rome Statute is supported by Article 21 concerning applicable law. This
provision requires the Court to apply the Statute ‘in the ﬁrst place’, along with
the Elements of Crimes and the Rules of Evidence, before applying ‘in the
second place’ custom or treaty law. Unlike the Rome Statute, the Amended
Protocol does not contain any provision on applicable law. But the absence of
such a provision would not preclude arguments that the provisions on the
international criminal jurisdiction of the African Court effectively conﬂate
jurisdiction and applicable law.
Interpreting Article 28Ibis of the Amended Protocol as a substantive provi-
sion is, in fact, the only workable approach to the offence of money launder-
ing. If prosecuting money laundering at the African Court is to be viable in
practice, then the provision itself must be understood as stating the applicable
law because of the absence of any customary international law prohibiting
money laundering. The existence of numerous treaty provisions that require
the criminalization of money laundering does not evidence the existence of a
parallel customary norm, despite the fact that some of these treaties enjoy high
ratiﬁcation levels. While state practice in criminalizing money laundering
may be widespread, this practice appears to stem, at least in part, from states’
32 R. O’Keefe, International Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) at s14.59.
33 Ibid.; M. Milanovic, ‘Is the Rome Statute Binding on Individuals? (And Why We Should
Care)’ 9 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2011) at 25; but see N. Boister, ‘Treaty
Crimes, International Criminal Court?’ New Criminal Law Review (2009) at 341, 347–8.
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treaty obligations, and not from a freestanding sense of legal obligation to do
so, which would be required for the requisite opinio juris. In addition, the
40 Recommendations on money laundering and terrorist ﬁnancing issued by
the FATF also cannot be taken as evidence of a customary norm prohibiting
money laundering. The FATF 40 Recommendations comprise a non-binding
instrument. Compliance with the anti-money laundering norms set out in the
Recommendations reveals nothing about whether states have a freestanding
sense of legal obligation. Instead, FATF has brought about widespread imple-
mentation of anti-money laundering laws through political and economic
pressure, and by encouraging states to comply with their existing treaty
obligations under the 1988 Vienna Convention and UNTOC.
The absence of a customary prohibition on money laundering is, in
essence, irrelevant for the jurisdiction of the African Court. When drafting
the constituent instrument of a judicial institution such as the African Court,
states may vest it with whatever jurisdiction they choose, and they can also
authorize it to apply any law of their choosing (subject to the principle of
legality).34 The subject matter jurisdiction and applicable law of international
courts and tribunals do not necessarily depend on existing customary or treaty
law, but may be determined by the constituent instrument itself. Nor must the
subject matter jurisdiction of international criminal courts be limited to
serious or grave crimes – a category into which offences like corruption and
money laundering may or may not fall, depending partly on how we under-
stand terms like serious and grave.35 While the ICC is indeed limited to ‘the
most serious crimes of international concern,’ this may be understood as a
policy decision made by the drafters of the Rome Statute, and not as the
consequence of any legal requirement.36
As a result of the fact that the Amended Protocol not only establishes
jurisdiction over money laundering but also sets forth the applicable law, it
may be understood as a treaty that creates international legal obligations for
individuals. While treaties that directly impose obligations on individuals or
legal persons are relatively rare in the international legal system, they are not
unheard of (see e.g. the 1949 Geneva Conventions).37 But in order to avoid
binding individuals or legal persons in states that did not consent to the
Amended Protocol, the jurisdictional scope of the money laundering
34 O’Keefe supra note 32, at s2.15.
35 But see A. Abass, ‘Prosecuting International Crimes in Africa: Rationale, Prospects and
Challenges’ (2013) 24 European Journal of International Law (2013) 339–940, at 933.
36 Rome Statute art. 1.
37 Milanovic supra note 33, 46–7.
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provision would have to be limited in practice to offences that occurred on the
territory of states parties, or offences committed by the nationals of states
parties.38 The exercise of jurisdiction over offences committed by non-
nationals outside of the territory of states parties to the Amended Protocol
would therefore run afoul of the principle of legality.39
This approach to the Amended Protocol, as a substantive as well as jurisdic-
tional provision, is workable due to the fact that Article 28Ibis is relatively
detailed. This provision closely resembles the money laundering provision in
the 1988 Vienna Convention, which has formed the basis for all subsequent
treaty provisions on money laundering. These treaty provisions are not neces-
sarily less detailed than domestic statutory provisions on money laundering,
and they could form a sufﬁcient basis for giving individuals and legal entities
notice of the actus reus, or the conduct that constitutes a criminal offence.
This approach to Article 28Ibis is also viable because the temporal jurisdiction
of the African Court is not retroactive.40 If the applicable law set out in Article
28Ibis could apply retroactively, then this would indeed pose a problem with
respect to the principle of legality.
Finally, Article 28Ibis does, however, fail to stipulate a mens rea require-
ment in its chapeau, unlike the 1988 Vienna Convention, UNTOC, and
UNCAC, which all require states parties to criminalize conduct that was
‘committed intentionally’. The omission of a mens rea requirement could
prove problematic from the perspective of the principle of legality, unless
prosecutors and judges at the African Court engage in some creative treaty
interpretation. The use of the word ‘knowing’ in Article 28Ibis(i) and the
phrase ‘with the knowledge’ in Article 28Ibis(ii) could, for instance, be taken
as indications that the conduct set out in this provision must be committed
intentionally. But if such arguments fail to persuade the judges, then this
apparent drafting error – which also plagues the other transnational criminal
law provisions – could indeed prevent the prosecution of money laundering,
along with many other offences set out in the Amended Protocol.
B. The Scope of the Court’s Jurisdiction over the Offence
of Money Laundering
Assuming that the principle of legality would not pose an insurmountable
problem for prosecutors at the African Court with respect to the offence of
38 Amended Protocol art. 46E bis(2)(a), (b).
39 Ibid., art. 46E bis(2)(c), (d).
40 Ibid., art. 46E(1).
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money laundering, the scope of the offence set out in the Amended Protocol
would nevertheless limit the provision’s practical application. The offence of
money laundering, as it appears in the Amended Protocol, is more limited
than the offence as it appears in the more recent universal treaties, UNTOC
and UNCAC, because it designates only ‘corruption or related offences’ as
predicate offences. The term predicate offence refers to an offence that
generates proceeds that may become the subject of a money laundering
offence.41 Both UNTOC and UNCAC contain money laundering provisions
that refer broadly to ‘the proceeds of crime’, without imposing limits on the
type of crime.42 The Amended Protocol, by contrast, adopts the approach
of the AU Convention, which limits the predicate offence to ‘corruption
or related offences’.43 By conﬁning the predicate offences to corruption or
related offences, as opposed to criminal offences generally, the Amended
Protocol greatly restricts the applicable scope of Article 28Ibis. In addition,
the meaning of ‘related offences’ is uncertain in the context of both the
Amended Protocol and the AU Convention, although it may be understood,
at least in part, as a reference to crimes such as the use or concealment of
proceeds derived from acts of corruption.44
In restricting the predicate offences for money laundering in this manner,
the Amended Protocol not only departs from UNTOC and UNCAC, but it
also runs contrary to the FATF 40 Recommendations. FATF Recommenda-
tion 3 indicates that states ‘should apply the crime of money laundering to all
serious offences, with a view to including the widest range of predicate
offences’. An interpretive note further explains that states may describe predi-
cate offences as ‘all offences’, or by reference to a list of predicate offences or a
particular threshold, such as serious offences or offences that attract a certain
penalty.45 Without a drafting history for the Amended Protocol, it is difﬁcult to
appreciate what might have inspired this decision to limit money laundering
to proceeds derived from corruption or related offences. From a policy
perspective, it is also difﬁcult to justify the limited scope of Art 28Ibis in light
of the well-known links between money laundering and the other inter-
national and transnational crimes set out in the Amended Protocol, such as
war crimes and crimes against humanity, piracy, terrorism, drug trafﬁcking,
human trafﬁcking, and the illicit exploitation of natural resources. As noted in
41 UNTOC art.. 2(h).
42 Ibid., art. 6; UNCAC art. 23.
43 Amended Protocol art. 28Ibis(1)(i).
44 Ibid., art. 28I(1)(h); AU Convention, art. 4(h).
45 FATF, The FATF Recommendations: International Standards on Combating Money
Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation, February 2012, at 34.
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Section 2 of this chapter, for example, money laundering has been linked to
the illicit exploitation of natural resources in both Sierra Leone and the DRC.
Yet laundering the proceeds of such illicit exploitation would fall outside of
the scope of Article 28Ibis.
It is also difﬁcult to appreciate why the drafters decided to conclude Article
28Ibis with a safeguard clause which provides that ‘[n]othing in this article
shall be interpreted as prejudicing the power of the Court to make a determin-
ation as to the seriousness of any act or offence’.46 This provision would be
logical if this Article described predicate offences by reference to a threshold
of seriousness. Given that sub-paragraph 1 deﬁnes predicate offences not as
serious offences, but as corruption or related offences, it is unclear why the
African Court would have an interest in safeguarding its authority to deter-
mine the ‘seriousness of any act or offence’. Because the Amended Protocol
limits predicate offences to ‘corruption or related offences’, this clause appears
to be overbroad in preserving the Court’s power to make threshold determin-
ations as to the seriousness of ‘any act or offence’.
Sub-paragraph 2 of Article 28Ibis would have been easier to explain if it had
preserved the African Court’s authority to determine what qualiﬁes as a serious
corruption offence. Article 28I, which concerns corruption, limits the scope of
corruption offences to acts ‘of a serious nature affecting the stability of a state,
region or the Union’.47 This clause has no origins in other international or
regional anti-corruption treaties. Nor does similar qualifying language appear
in any of the other transnational criminal law provisions in the Amended
Protocol, except for the offence of illicit exploitation of natural resources, set
out in Article 28Lbis.48 The terms ‘serious’, ‘stability’ and ‘region’ are
undeﬁned and open to debate, and therefore likely to result in preliminary
challenges by those accused of corruption.49 For unknown reasons, the
drafters of the Amended Protocol apparently considered it necessary to limit
the scope of only the corruption offences and the offence of illicit exploitation
of natural resources. None of the other transnational criminal law offences,
which could also result in prosecutions of relatively minor infractions as well
as more major violations, have a seriousness threshold. Perhaps, in the eyes of
46 Art. 28Ibis(2).
47 Amended Protocol art. 28I(1). See also J. Hatchard’s discussion of this phrase in ‘Combating
Corruption Effectively? The Role of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights’ in the
same volume, Section 3A.
48 For a discussion of this phrase in the context of the offence of illicit exploitation of natural
resources see D. Dam and J. G. Stewart, ‘Illicit Exploitation of Natural Resources’ in the same
volume, Section 1.
49 Ibid.
Money Laundering and the African Court 517
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108525343.019
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Walaeus Library LUMC, on 15 May 2019 at 08:45:38, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
the drafters, any violations, however minor, of the other transnational criminal
law offences would potentially be suitable for prosecution by the African
Court, while this would not be the case for instances of petty corruption, for
example. Alternatively, the drafters may have had concerns about giving the
Prosecution unfettered discretion to bring corruption charges in particular.
But without travaux préparatoires for the Amended Protocol, these possible
explanations remain speculative.
The inclusion of a seriousness threshold for corruption and illicit exploit-
ation of natural resources, but not for any of the other transnational crimes, is
questionable. In light of the sheer frequency with which crimes like drug
trafﬁcking and trafﬁcking in persons are committed in Africa, the other
provisions covering transnational crimes arguably could have also beneﬁted
from a threshold of some sort. During the drafting of the Rome Statute, by
contrast, concerns about ﬂooding the ICC with the prosecution of offences
like drug trafﬁcking led, in part, to exclusion of transnational crimes from the
Rome Statute.50 In addition, the prosecution of the remaining four offences –
war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and aggression – is limited to
‘the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a
whole’. Regardless of the reasons why the drafters limited the African Court’s
jurisdiction over corruption, the effect is to limit the Court’s jurisdiction over
money laundering as well as corruption, as the scope of the money laundering
provision depends in part on the scope of its predicate offence, corruption.
C. Application of Jurisdictional Preconditions to the Offence
of Money Laundering
The African Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the offence of money laun-
dering would also be limited by the fact that only two out of the four general
preconditions for the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction, set out in Article 46Ebis,
would apply to this offence. Article 46Ebis(2), which suffers from its own
drafting problems, appears to provide for the exercise of jurisdiction by the
African Court on the basis of (a) territoriality, (b) active personality, (c) passive
personality, and (d) the protective principle, which covers extraterritorial acts
that threaten a vital interest of a state party.51 Though Article 46Ebis(2)
50 Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Summary of
the Proceedings of the Preparatory Committee during the Period 25March–12 April 1996, § 72.
51 For a discussion of the drafting problems see V. Nerlich, ‘Preconditions to the Exercise of
Jurisdiction (Article 46Ebis), Exercise of Jurisdiction (Article 46F) and the Prosecutor (Article
46G)’ in G. Werle and M. Vormbaum (eds), The African Criminal Court: A Commentary on
the Malabo Protocol (Asser Press, 2016).
518 Cecily Rose
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108525343.019
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Walaeus Library LUMC, on 15 May 2019 at 08:45:38, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
curiously omits any reference to states parties, it appears that this provision is
meant to provide for the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over crimes commit-
ted on the territory of a state party and by a national of a state party, in addition
to crimes that victimize the nationals of a state party or threaten the vital
interests of a state party.52 In the case of money laundering, however, only the
territoriality and active personality principles are applicable.
The protective principle is inapplicable in the money laundering context on
account of the principle of legality. As mentioned above, the principle of nullum
crimen sine legewould be violated by the application of Article 28Ibis to nationals
of non-states parties for acts committed outside of the territory of a state party to
the Amended Protocol. Because the Amended Protocol sets out the substantive
law onmoney laundering (in the absence of customary law), the Court’s exercise
of jurisdiction is limited to conduct that takes place on the territory of a state
party, and/or by one of its nationals. As a consequence, extraterritorial acts of
money laundering by non-nationals fall outside of the jurisdiction of the Court,
even where they threaten a vital interest of a state party.53
In addition, the jurisdictional precondition based on the protective
principle, or the nationality of the victim of the crime, would also be of little
relevance in the case of money laundering. Article 46Ebis(2)(c) provides that
the Court may exercise jurisdiction ‘when the victim of the crime is a national’
of a state party. The commission of many of the offences set out in the
Amended Protocol would produce identiﬁable victims, such as trafﬁcked
persons, the crew or passengers detained by pirates, and persons killed or
injured by acts of terrorism. In the case of money laundering, however,
identifying victims would be a difﬁcult, if not impossible task in many
instances. This is not to argue that money laundering is a ‘victimless crime’.
Rather, the identiﬁcation of victims or persons affected by the offence of
money laundering is not a straightforward or even feasible task, as it might
be in the case of crimes involving death or injury, for example.
In seeking to identify the victims of an act of money laundering, the African
Court would have to identify the victims of the predicate offence of corruption
or related offences. While disposing of the proceeds of crime may not, in itself,
produce victims, the predicate crime of corruption may indeed cause harm to
persons or legal entities. But acts of corruption ‘of a serious nature affecting
the stability of a state, region or the Union’ are likely to generate an exception-
ally wide range of potential victims. Acts of corruption that would actually
have such an impact on stability (whether political, economic, legal, etc.) are
52 Ibid.
53 Amended Protocol art. 46Ebis(2)(d).
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likely to have innumerable victims among the population of a state, region, or
the African continent. Corrupt conduct that entails such consequences is
inherently unlikely to have affected a discrete number of persons who may
be identiﬁed by the African Court for jurisdictional purposes. Even if this were
the case, difﬁcult questions might arise as to who or what ought to qualify as a
victim in the ﬁrst place (a term that the Amended Protocol does not deﬁne).
In light of these conceptual challenges, the jurisdictional precondition based
on the nationality of the victim is likely to be unworkable in the context of the
money laundering offence, limited as it is to predicate crimes involving
corrupt acts (or related offences) of a serious nature.
The jurisdictional preconditions for money laundering would therefore be
limited to acts on the territory of a state party, and acts by a national of a state
party.54 The full scope of the African Court’s territorial jurisdiction may,
however, still be an open question in the context of money laundering. Would
acts of money laundering that are begun in a state party and completed in a
non-state party such as Switzerland, fall under the scope of its territorial
jurisdiction? Such an interpretation would give the African Court a signiﬁ-
cantly greater capacity to prosecute money laundering, which is likely to
involve cross border transactions in which money ﬂows from Africa to inter-
national banking centres outside of Africa.
4. evidentiary challenges
If prosecutors were to surmount the potential jurisdictional hurdles
described in Section 3, then another set of evidentiary challenges might
await. This Section focuses on two challenges in particular: the complexities
of ﬁnancial investigations from an evidentiary perspective, and the African
Court’s likely dependence on cooperation from non-state parties as well as
private sector entities.
A. Complex Financial Investigations
Financial investigations, of the sort that would be necessary to bring charges of
corruption and money laundering, would be quite distinct from the types of
investigations that are typically required for cases involving crimes against
humanity, etc. At the modern international criminal courts and tribunals,
post Nuremberg, witness testimony has been dominant, in good part because
54 Amended Protocol, art. 46Ebis(2)(a), (b).
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documentary evidence of atrocities has often not been readily available.55 The
accused who appeared before the International Criminal Tribunals for the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, for example, did not keep the sort of meticu-
lous documentary records that the Nazis did during the Holocaust. But
investigations of acts of corruption and money laundering would require
prosecutors at the African Court to focus on documentary evidence to a much
greater extent than has been the case at modern international criminal courts
and tribunals to date. While witness testimony could feature in trials for
corruption and money laundering at the African Court, such testimony is
likely to play a lesser, secondary role as compared with trials at the ad hoc
tribunals, for instance.
Furthermore, ﬁnancial investigations involving transactional forensics are
likely to be exceptionally data intensive.56 In order to identify and document
the movement of money, future prosecutors and investigators at the African
Court should expect to draw on bank account statements, wire transfer records,
ﬁnancial statements, tax records, customs records, etc.57 Complex ﬁnancial
investigations require lawyers to work together with professionals from other
ﬁelds, including ﬁnancial investigators, forensic accountants, and forensic
computer specialists.58 A multidisciplinary investigation team would likely be
necessary, and it would undoubtedly be expensive. Many commentators have
already noted that the range of transnational crimes included within the
jurisdiction of the African Court will increase its operating costs.59 This is likely
to be especially true for the types of ﬁnancial investigations needed to support
prosecutions for money laundering. Such investigations are likely to be highly
resource intensive in terms of both required personnel and funding. Should the
Court struggle ﬁnancially, as have its predecessor institutions, complex ﬁnan-
cial investigations would likely be quite burdensome for this institution.
B. Cooperation with States and Private Actors
Even if prosecutors and investigators at the African Court possessed the
necessary budget and staff for conducting ﬁnancial investigations, the type of
55 N. Combs, Fact-Finding without the Facts: The Uncertain Evidentiary Foundations of
International Criminal Convictions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) at 12.
56 Financial Action Task Force,Operational Issues: Financial Investigations Guidance, June 2012,
§ 23.
57 Ibid. at §§ 27–8.
58 Ibid.
59 M. Du Plessis, ‘Implications of the AU Decision to Give the African Court Jurisdiction over
International Crimes’, Institute for Security Studies No. 234, June 2012, 9–10.
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evidence needed for prosecuting money laundering still might not be forth-
coming. As with ﬁnancial investigations at the domestic level, investigators at
the African Court would need to be able to compel the production of
evidence.60 But in contrast with courts and prosecutors in domestic legal
systems, the African Court lacks the capacity to directly compel banks or other
private institutions to produce documentary evidence. Like all international
courts and tribunals, the African Court would be dependent on cooperation
from states and also international organizations like the United Nations. But
state cooperation would be particularly important for ﬁnancial investigations
because the African Court would depend on states not only to produce
government documents such as tax or customs records, but also to act as
intermediaries between the Court and private actors. The African Court
would depend on states to order private entities to produce evidence such as
bank account statements and wire transfers.61
The Amended Protocol accordingly provides for cooperation by states with
the African Court, but these provisions are likely to leave the Court heavily
dependent on the good will of non-African states that would not (and could
not) be parties to the Amended Protocol. The Amended Protocol would, for
example, require states parties to cooperate with the African Court with
respect to requests for assistance and orders for the production of evidence
and also the freezing of assets for the purpose of eventual forfeiture.62 But the
African Court could not compel non-states parties to cooperate with it.
Instead, the Court would only be entitled to seek, rather than compel, cooper-
ation by non-state parties as well as regional or international courts and
partners of the African Union.63 Given that states must consent to the juris-
diction of international courts and tribunals, it could not, of course, be
otherwise. The Court could nevertheless seek to build a system for cooper-
ation with non-state parties by concluding separate cooperation agreements
60 FATF supra note 56, § 75.
61 This predicament arose, for example, in The Prosecutor v Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, where
the Prosecution requested three years of the accused’s bank records. See Decision on
Prosecution’s application for a ﬁnding of non-compliance under Article 87(7) of the Statute
(ICC-01/09/02/11), 3 December 2014, § 33. The Kenyan government did not take steps to
compel the production of bank records or facilitate a meeting between the Prosecution and
relevant bank ofﬁcials. Ibid. § 66. The Trial Chamber considered that the Kenyan
Government’s failure to provide all of the requested bank records, ‘or to take steps to do so, fell
below the standard of good faith cooperation required from States Parties’. Ibid. § 67. The
Prosecution dropped the charges in this case on 5 December 2014 due to lack of evidence
and the Trial Chamber terminated the proceedings on 13 March 2015.
62 Amended Protocol, art. 46L(2)(b), (f ).
63 Ibid. at art. 46L(3).
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with them, to the extent possible.64 Unlike the ICC, however, the African
Court would lack the ability to seek assistance from the UN Security Council,
which has the capacity to impose cooperation obligations on UN members
that are non-state parties to the Rome Statute.65 The Amended Protocol makes
no mention of cooperation directly with non-state actors such as banks, as all
such cooperation would be ordered by states themselves.
Due to the structure of the international banking system, ﬁnancial investi-
gations in money laundering cases would likely strain the African Court’s
cooperation regime, as the Court would probably ﬁnd itself most in need of
cooperation by non-states parties. Much money laundering in Africa is
undoubtedly conﬁned to the continent, and thus to potential states parties to
the Amended Protocol. But the type of corruption and money laundering cases
that would fall within the African Court’s jurisdiction would likely involve
banks in major western ﬁnancial centres in non-states parties, especially in non-
states parties with bank secrecy laws that are favourable to money launderers. In
conﬁning the Court’s jurisdiction over corruption and money laundering cases
to serious corruption that affects the stability of a state, region or the African
Union, the Amended Protocol brings to mind instances of heads of state and
other high-level ofﬁcials who have laundered embezzled state funds through
Swiss bank accounts and through the purchase of luxury real estate in Paris,
Miami or New York.66 In other words, corruption and money laundering of the
requisite severity is very likely to have a signiﬁcant extraterritorial component
that would necessitate cooperation with non-state parties.
The African Court’s success in securing the cooperation of non-state parties,
whether on an ad hoc basis or through permanent cooperation agreements,
could depend in part on the extent to which those non-states parties were
pursuing their own investigations of the same or related conduct. While
parallel domestic investigations could, in theory, facilitate cooperation
between states and the African Court, in practice, states might instead view
international investigations as potential disruptions to domestic law enforce-
ment efforts. It may be expected that some non-state parties could prove
unwilling or highly reluctant to cooperate with investigations by the African
Court that could interfere with long-standing, carefully designed domestic
investigations. The same concerns actually formed the basis for some of the
64 Ibid. at art. 46L(3).
65 O’Keefe, supra note 32, at s14.86.
66 See e.g. L. Story and S. Saul, ‘Stream of Foreign Wealth Flows to Elite New York Real Estate’
The New York Times (7 February 2015).
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objections that were raised by states regarding the inclusion of transnational
crimes like drug trafﬁcking and terrorism in the Rome Statute.
The United States, for example, expressed concerns about how the pros-
ecution of drug trafﬁckers and terrorists by the ICC would interfere with and
undermine investigations undertaken by the United States, often in cooper-
ation with other states.67 The United States described its own investigations as
highly sophisticated, costly, wide ranging, and long-term (often spanning
many years). These investigations are geared towards prevention as well as
prosecution, and tend to involve sensitive and conﬁdential information. The
United States considered that the integrity of such domestic investigations
could be undermined by ICC investigations and prosecutions, which are
typically more limited and not concerned with prevention. The United States
feared that ICC investigators might make different decisions about who and
when to apprehend, and could also compromise sources of intelligence.
The same types of concerns could also be expected in the context of
investigations and prosecutions at the African Court with respect to economic
crimes such as corruption and money laundering. FATF has speciﬁcally
noted that in domestic settings, investigators should make timely use of search
warrants in order to seize documentary evidence or electronic data so as to
minimize opportunities for suspects to destroy information.68 Poor coordin-
ation of corruption and money laundering investigations by the African Court
and by domestic jurisdictions could conceivably result in suspects purging
records or destroying evidence. In such circumstances, non-states parties
would likely decline to cooperate altogether, or would cooperate only after
carrying out domestic investigations. The timing of investigations and pros-
ecutions by the African Court for corruption and money laundering may
therefore be heavily dependent on the timing of domestic investigations.
The two could potentially be complementary if domestic law enforcement
efforts were to result in the freezing and seizure of assets while a parallel case
at the African Court were to result in individual criminal liability. The African
Court could potentially stand to beneﬁt from domestic enforcement actions in
non-state Parties, as long as it is willing to wait for the initiation or even
completion of domestic proceedings which unearth evidence and identify
assets. The African Court could, however, ﬁnd itself somewhat dependent on
domestic investigators pursuing timely enforcement actions in the ﬁrst place,
while the relevant evidence still exists.
67 Comments Received Pursuant to Paragraph 4 of General Assembly Resolution 49/53 of the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, UN Doc. A/AC.244/1/Add.2, 31March 1995.
68 FATF supra note 56, § 78.
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It is also conceivable, however, that such timing problems might never arise
on account of the provision for immunity in Article 46Abis. The Amended
Protocol’s controversial immunity provision precludes the prosecution of
heads of state or government (‘or anybody acting or entitled to act in such
capacity, or other senior state ofﬁcials based on their functions’) during their
tenure of ofﬁce.69 This provision is quite likely to result in the delay of
prosecutions of money laundering because the predicate crime of corruption
or related offences is limited to acts ‘of a serious nature affecting the stability of
a state, region or the Union’. Corruption of this magnitude necessarily tends to
involve high-level government ofﬁcials who would fall within the scope of
Article 46Abis, and would thus be protected from prosecution for the duration
of their time in ofﬁce. In practice, whether this immunity provision would
merely delay prosecutions of government ofﬁcials, or effectively render them
impossible, remains to be seen. In the meantime, private individuals could, of
course, still be prosecuted for the laundering of funds derived from private
sector corruption – assuming that such conduct would reach the seriousness
threshold of the corruption provision.70
5. asset recovery and reparations
From the perspective of reparations for victims and the repatriation of stolen
assets, the inclusion of the offence of money laundering in the jurisdiction of
the African Court is innovative and could, at least in theory, facilitate the
Court’s ability to carry out this aspect of its mandate. Article 45 of the
Amended Protocol provides that the Court ‘may make an order directly
against a convicted person specifying appropriate reparations to, or in respect
of, victims, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation’.71 This
provision depends on the Court’s ability to seize or bring about the transfer
of assets of convicted persons. Article 43 of the Amended Protocol accordingly
provides that ‘the Court may order the forfeiture of any property, proceeds or
any asset acquired unlawfully or by criminal conduct, and their return to their
rightful owner or to an appropriate Member State’.72 In reality, these provi-
sions may not function as intended, and the Court may instead need to rely on
69 See D. Tladi, ‘Immunities’, in G. Werle and M. Vormbaum (eds), The African Criminal
Court: A Commentary on the Malabo Protocol (The Hague: Asser Press, 2016); Amnesty
International, Malabo Protocol: Legal and Institutional Implications of the Merged and
Expanded African Court (2016), 26–7.
70 See Hatchard, supra note 47.
71 Amended Protocol art. 45(2).
72 Ibid. at 43A(5).
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money laundering investigations in order to locate assets and request domestic
jurisdictions to order freezing, seizure, and conﬁscation.
As trials at other international criminal courts and tribunals have shown,
accused may not cooperate with orders by the African Court for the forfeiture
of property, proceeds or assets acquired by criminal conduct. In fact, accused
persons may claim indigence while having actually hidden vast wealth abroad,
in overseas bank accounts under other names, for example. The prosecution
of Charles Taylor by the SCSL raised just this problem, as Taylor received
legal aid from the SCSL, while the SCSL attempted to trace his assets. Thus,
forfeiture orders by the African Court under Article 43 may be wholly ineffect-
ive, and it may instead be necessary to rely on cooperating states to freeze the
bank accounts of accused persons while the prosecution is ongoing. Following
a conviction, the African Court could potentially reach agreements for the
provision of reparations or the repatriation of funds to an African Union
member state, but this would have to be arranged on a case-by-case basis
between the African Court, the cooperating state, and potentially also the
member state (if the state itself were the recipient of the repatriated funds).
Financial investigations that focus on money laundering could, in fact, play
a signiﬁcant role in helping the African Court to identify assets of accused
persons that may be used for reparations should they be convicted. Money
laundering investigations could potentially play a supporting role in cases
involving a range of offences, from war crimes and crimes against humanity,
to drug trafﬁcking and terrorism. The narrow subject matter of the offence of
money laundering, as set out in the Amended Protocol, may preclude convic-
tions linked to predicate crimes beyond acts of corruption, but money laun-
dering investigations by the African Court need not lead to criminal charges.
The Court could perhaps conduct investigations of money laundering linked
to other predicate offences, with a view to identifying assets rather than
supporting a prosecution for money laundering. The ICC, for example, has
conducted ﬁnancial investigations in a number of its cases despite lacking the
capacity to bring criminal charges for such conduct. Money laundering
investigations thus have the potential to play an important role in facilitating
reparations for victims, beyond cases involving corruption.
6. conclusion
Almost all of the potential obstacles to prosecuting money laundering at the
African Court could ultimately be resolvable, apart from the inherently
limited scope of the offence as stipulated in the Amended Protocol. Argu-
ments about the principle of nullum crimen sine lege could be defeated on the
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basis that the Amended Protocol itself provides the applicable law, and does so
only on a prospective basis. The text of Article 28Ibis of the Amended Protocol
thus alleviates the need to prove the existence of a separate customary prohib-
ition on money laundering, which would not be a fruitful exercise. In
addition, the jurisdictional preconditions that would be available to the
African Court in situations involving money laundering would be limited,
but still workable. The African Court’s capacity to exercise personal jurisdic-
tion over extraterritorial acts by non-nationals which threaten the vital interests
of the state would run contrary to the principle of nullum crimen sine lege, and
must be discarded as a possibility. Likewise, the African Court’s ability to
exercise jurisdiction over victims with the nationality of a state party is hard to
reconcile with the realities of money laundering and serious acts of corrup-
tion, which typically lack clearly identiﬁable victims. But the African Court
could still exercise jurisdiction over nationals of a state party, as well as crimes
committed on the territory of a state party. The options available to the African
Court are thus limited to those of the ICC – a workable outcome.73
The African Court could also face a number of evidentiary challenges, but
these too are surmountable, at least in theory if not in practice. With enough
funding and appropriate expertise, investigators at the African Court would be
capable of carrying out the types of complex ﬁnancial investigations needed to
obtain evidence of money laundering as well as corruption. But the potential
evidentiary obstacles go beyond the availability of ﬁnancial and human
resources, as the African Court also does not have the legal authority to impose
cooperation obligations on non-states parties. Yet, the cooperation of non-
states parties may be especially important for prosecutions of money launder-
ing because most major ﬁnancial centres lie outside of Africa. While non-
states parties may be hesitant, and cooperation will most likely not be forth-
coming in some instances, it is conceivable that given the right timing and
political circumstances, the African Court could secure the cooperation of
non-state parties.
By contrast, the last remaining obstacle may be inescapable, that is, the
Amended Protocol’s restrictive deﬁnition of the predicate crimes for money
laundering. Instead of including all serious crimes within the scope of the
predicate offences for money laundering, or all crimes included in the
Amended Protocol, Article 28Ibis inexplicably limits the predicate offences
to the proceeds of serious acts of corruption. Without a drafting history, it is
impossible to know why the Amended Protocol departs from the money
73 Rome Statute, art. 12(2).
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laundering provisions of the 1988 Vienna Convention, UNTOC, and
UNCAC. The narrowness of the money laundering provision included in
the Amended Protocol will form an obstacle to frequent reliance on this
provision by prosecutors. In fact, money laundering charges may be rare given
the further narrowness of its predicate crime, corruption. This obstacle will
not prevent prosecutions for money laundering, but it will make them very
unlikely. The drafters thereby relegated money laundering to a peripheral role
in prosecutions at the African Court, which is unfortunate given that eco-
nomic crimes can be among the structural causes of armed conﬂict, as
prosecutors at the ICC have already discovered.
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